sample source from giving a DNA sample to some third party such as an insurance company, so that the insurance company could gather genetic information on the source's sibling. This paper notes this lacuna in the Act and proposes remedies. This paper represents a critique the U.S. Genetic Privacy Act. The Genetic Privacy Act is a proposal for U.S. Federal legislation completed in February of 1995. It is the result of a project entitled "Guidelines for Protecting Privacy of Information Stored in Genetic Data Banks". The writing of this Act was fimded by the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project (ELSI), the Office of Energy Research, U.S. Department of Energy. The purpose of the Act is to "protect the genetic privacy of individuals."
While the Act succeeds admirably in safeguarding the privacy of individuals from whom genetic information is gathered (the person named "the sample source" in the Act), it fails to protect adequately the privacy of others genetically related to the sample source. For example, there is nothing in the Act to prevent a sibling --with informed consent and entirely voluntarily --tiom giving a DNA sample to some third party, e.g., an insurance company, so that the insurance company could gather genetic mformation on his or her brother or sister.
With the mapping of the Human Genome going hand-in-hand with the development of genetic resting, there is a dramatic increase in the importance of genetic information. Guidelines and legislation are needed to structure both legally and ethically the gathering and the dissemination of genetic information. to other types of information, the privacy of genetic information is relevant not only for the sample source, but for many other individuals. Accordingly, the Genetic Privacy Act must take into account not only the privacy of the sample source, but also that of genetically related others. One reasonable way of dealing with the unique character of genetic information is to make the information gathered as individualized as possible. By individualizing the information (e.g., not recording siblings, parents, offspring), genetic information can be made to resemble consent, which is essentially individualized. In this way, one can attempt to respect the wishes of those who do not want to know, or who do not want others (insurance companies, employers) to know their genetic status, but who are genetically related to someone else who does want to have this information gathered and recorded Thus, if one records the information in as individualized a manner as possible, one will render the information recorded as individual as the consent that legitimates the gathering and recordation. To the extent to which the information is rendered individualized, the discrepancy between the group-import of genetic information and the essentially iidividuaked character of consent can be reduced and rendered less legally and ethically problematic. This is the principle of information individualization, or the PII. In accordance with the PIT, one would not, for example, create a database of genetic and genealogical infomation without the consent of all those about whom information was gathered. For in such a case, there would be too great a gap between the individualized character of consent and the group-character of the information recorded.
To balance out the greater value accorded by the Act to individuals' claims to know their genetic status over the claims of others whose status will be revealed and who do not want information gathered and recorded, one should have access to genetic information bearing upon oneself, regardless of the source of that information. That is, if one's sibling may without one's consent have genetic information gathered and recorded that bears upon oneself, then one should be granted access to any information that is linked to one's own record, regardless of the fact that another was the source of the donnation. This will also help insure that the PII is followed; and that if it is not, the individual w i l l at least h o w that it has been breached. Thus, if one's sibling had a genetic test, one would have no claim to know the results, as long as those results, in accordance with the Pa, never were linked with one's own information.
Moreover, it is necessary for the Act explicitly to recognize that consent is essentially individualized; that is, one can consent only for oneself (or as a surrogate, on behalf of those who cannot consent for themelves.).In short, one may not consent that information be gathered from oneself in order to determine the genetic status of a genetically related individual (unless that other consents.) In this respect, the Act needs to be more explicit in ruling out certain uses to which the sample source might consent. That is, the Act prevents information from being used for purposes other than those for which it was gathered without the consent of the person from whom it was gathered. Yet, even this restriction must be narrowed, for the discrepancy between the groupnature of genetic information and the individual character of consent poses problems here, too. E.g., if one had a genetic test for diagnostic purposes, this information could not legitimately be used insofar as it bore upon a parent or sibling, regardless of the consent of the one from whom the information was gathered. The sample source's consent must be recognized as essentially limited to the sample source's consenting to the gathering of information only insofar as it bears upon the sample source. Just as one can consent only to specific uses of information, so also, one can consent, only for oneself, and never for another competent individual.
In conclusion, revisions and modifications of the genetic Privacy Act are in order so that it may achieve its goal of protecting "the genetic privacy of individuals", without regard to whether those individuals are the source from which genetic information is gathered.
